By: Will Jennings and Gerry Stoker

Guest bloggers Will Jennings and Gerry Stoker suggest that austerity leaves citizens raging against a short-sighted, self-serving leadership provided by politicians.

Battered by the effects of austerity citizens have not lost faith in the capacity of government to deliver but rather have become massively turned off by the short-sighted, self-serving leadership provided by politicians. As far as the public is concerned politics is failing not because of the challenges of austerity but because of the flawed character of Britain’s political class. That judgement is widely shared but particularly strongly felt among those who form the backbone of Britain’s voters: those in their middle to later years.  UKIP’s rise to prominence may be the most visible expression of anti-politics sentiment but it would appear that it’s just the tip of the iceberg. Most citizens think that government can make a difference and that politics is not a waste of time. This strong residual support for our democratic system, however, is drowned by a tsunami of derision for the behaviour of our political leaders.

Politicians: You are the problem

We asked respondents in a YouGov survey (1) a series of questions about the ability and willingness of politicians to deal with the problems facing Britain today. (See full results here)

Importantly, a majority of people (63% agreeing, compared to 13% disagreeing) still believe that politicians in government can make a difference to major social and economic issues. So it’s not fatalism about government that troubles most citizens; the public’s concerns are more about those who are steering the ship of state.

The most striking results from our survey concern the prevalent view that politicians are too focused on short-term headlines and are more concerned with protecting the interests of the already rich and powerful in our society. A remarkable 80% of the public agreed with the statement that “politicians are too focused on short-term chasing of headlines”, with just 3% of respondents disagreeing. Views about the privileging of the rich and the powerful are similarly lopsided, with 72% of respondents agreeing that politics “is dominated by self-seeking politicians protecting the interests of the already rich and powerful in our society”, and just 8% disagreeing. There is a widespread feeling that politicians and politics has lost its way, and no longer look to stand up for the public in the face of powerful special interests. In the wake of further scandals over lobbying, presided over by a government dominated by Eton and Oxbridge-educated politicians, such feelings will surely only be reinforced.

Competence, Honesty and Blame

There are also strong undercurrents of public opinion that question the competence and honesty of politicians, and their taste for finger-pointing. Some 52% of people do not believe that politicians “have the technical knowledge needed to solve the problems facing Britain today”, compared to just 20% who have faith in their competence. Such a prevailing view is highly problematic in a political context where voters are increasingly less likely to identify with parties and now are more likely to vote on the basis of evaluations of their competence in delivering on policies and managing public services. To similar effect, there is a sense of a lack of courage on the part of politicians to “tell the public the truth about the tough decisions that need to be made”, with 40% of respondents rejecting the idea that the political class are able to show leadership (and just 33% believing they can). Further, there is substantial agreement that politicians have “exaggerated the scale of the economic crisis – by blaming either the previous or the current government” with 47% agreeing with this statement and 28% disagreeing.

Differences in Opinion by Party Support and Demographics

When we drill down into the attitudes of different sectors of society, the results are even more striking. There are significant differences in terms of party support and age – but not necessarily in ways that would be expected.

While disengagement with politics is often painted as a problem of younger citizens, we find that older respondents are most negative of all about politicians. Across almost every measure, older citizens hold more negative attitudes about the capabilities and intentions of politicians. Yet belief that government can make a difference is stronger among these groups. Disappointment is, perhaps, the inevitable product of belief that politics and government can make a difference but is failing to do so.

There are party differences too. Of all the parties, UKIP supporters are most negative about politics and government across the board. A plurality of UKIP supporters (44% to 39%) agree that ‘politics is a waste of time’ – in contrast to supporters of all the other main parties, a majority of whom disagree with this statement. UKIP supporters even more predominantly believe that politics is dominated by ‘self-seeking politicians protecting the interests of the already rich and powerful in our society’, by a remarkable margin of 85% in agreement compared to 3% disagreeing (in contrast, 53% of Conservative supporters agree with this statement and 20% disagree).

When asked to weigh up how our politics is managing austerity and economic downturn it’s not fatalism about the capacity of government or politics that comes to the fore for most citizens. What emerges is a sense of being failed by a political class that lacks the competence and strength of character to follow the right policy options and above all is too short-term, media obsessed and in cahoots with the rich and powerful to provide leadership in the public interest. Britain is weighed down by a substantial fiscal deficit but as far as the public is concerned it is also suffering from a depressing shortfall in the quality of its political class.

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By: the Editors

Terrorism is shaped by the same societies it rejects. A signature theme of modern times, for instance, is the expanded power of individuals – to disperse and galvanise power, and to self-publicise to audiences that dwarf sporting arenas. These dynamics increasingly extend to violent extremism, it seems, as the omnipresent camera phone is helping to emancipate would-be extremists and ‘lone wolves’ from a reliance on larger-scale attacks and infrastructure.

Audience and shock factor are basic components of terrorism, and according to recent events in Woolwich, the up-close and amplifying power of the smart phone can do as much as explosives to steal the news cycle with images of bloodied hands and household knives. It has also transformed the rest of us into film-crews on permanent stand-by as extremism’s most reliable publicist. Hence in the short time it took for armed police to respond, one of the assailants could fit in in a scene-side interview including with Q&A.

The integration debate had already been intensified by five years of squeezed living standards and a reaction in various quarters against the globalising tide of foreign people, products and cultures washing over national borders.

But the aftermath of events in Woolwich clearly introduced new levels of militancy and anxiety to the issue.

To support on-going research with Cambridge University on the politics of human rights and integration, YouGov recently conducted a study comparing attitudes towards different backgrounds and generations of diaspora in Britain.

(See full results here)

First we asked different samples and sub-samples of respondents how well, if at all, they thought several groups were integrating into British society. These included three broad categories of: [1] ‘migrants from Eastern Europe’, [2] ‘migrants from African countries’ and [3] ‘migrants from Muslim countries’, plus one specific diaspora of ‘migrants from Pakistan’.

Results in Table 1 show a broadly negative attitude towards the progress of integration across all groups, with an integration hierarchy in which Muslim migrants are clearly viewed as the least well integrated.

(NB: ‘total well’ in this case equals the percentage of those saying ‘fairly’ plus ‘very’ well; and ‘total not well’ equals the percentage saying ‘not very’ plus ‘not at all’ well)

– 46% of respondents describe migrants from African countries as integrating either ‘not very’ or ‘not at all’ well, versus 31% saying they are integrating either ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ well, giving this group a net integration score of -15 (equals ‘total well’  minus ‘total not well’).

– Next in the table are migrants from Eastern Europe, with 54% describing them as integrating ‘not very’ or ‘not at all’ well, versus 34% saying ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ well, with a net integration score of -20.

– Migrants from Pakistan are seen as integrating marginally less well with 57% saying ‘total not well’ versus 28% saying ‘total well’ and a net integration score of -29.

– Finally, 71% of respondents describe migrants from Muslim countries as integrating ‘not very’ or ‘not at all’ well, versus 34% saying fairly’ or ‘very’ well, producing a notably lower net integration score of -50.

Table 1: Generally speaking, how well, if at all, do you think that migrants from [African countries/ Eastern Europe/ Pakistan/ Muslim countries] are integrating into British society?

This is not to say, however, that the direction of British opinion in this study remains broadly negative.

A second question was asked about how well the children of these migrant groups are integrating.

Results in Table 2 show a kind of ‘off-spring effect’ across all groups, where the next generation is viewed as doing substantially better at integrating into British society than its parents.

– Net integration scores for African and Eastern European groups shift from -15 and -20 to +10 in both cases, showing a positive movement of 25 and 30 points respectively.

– The proportion of respondents describing these two next-generation groups as integrating ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ well becomes a plurality in each case – 43% ‘total well’ versus 33% ‘total unwell’ for the children of African migrants and 42% ‘total well’ versus 32% ‘total unwell’ for the children of Eastern Europeans.

There’s also a larger positive shift in net integration scores for the children of migrants from both Pakistani and Muslim countries more generally – 35 points in both cases.

– Pakistani children now receive the highest positive score of all groups, as the proportion of respondents describing them as integrating ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ well becomes a plurality– with 46% saying ‘total well’ versus 40% saying ‘total unwell’.

– The children of migrants from Muslim countries more broadly are still seen by a majority as not integrating well, but this number falls from 71% ‘total not well’ for their parent’s generation to 53%.

Naturally there are clear differences among supporters of the big three parties and UKIP

– UKIP supporters resist a change in overall direction of attitude towards the integration of children from any group. Only UKIP voters see no improvement in integration between Muslim generations.

– Conservative supporters fall nearly into line with the overall total in attitudes to the children of migrants from an African background (41% ‘total well’ versus 38% ‘total not well’), but are divided over the integration of children from Eastern European migrants (41% ‘total well’ versus 43% ‘total not well’) and retain a majority saying the children of migrants from Pakistan and Muslim countries more generally are not integrating well. (respectively for Pakistan: 53% ‘total well’ versus 38% ‘total not well’; for Muslim countries: 53% ‘total well’ versus 39% ‘total not well’)

– A majority or plurality of Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems) say that all groups are integrating fairly or very well, except for initial migrants from Muslim countries (53% ‘total well’ versus 37% ‘not well’) and from Pakistan or African countries, where Lib Dems are roughly divided in each case.

– A plurality or majority of Labour supporters shift towards saying the children of all groups are integrating ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ well, but remain divided over the children of migrants from Muslim countries.

From this research, there’s little doubting significant levels of public concern towards the perceived, cultural challenge of Muslim integration into British society, and more noticeably compared with other diasporas.

But a broad section of the public also clearly sees a positive integrating effect from longer settlement, which reflects a widely held belief that this challenge is softening from one generation to the next.

This is evident not only in the distinction between attitudes to migrants and their children, but also in distinctions between Muslim migrants in general and more positive views on continued integration for the Pakistani diaspora, which has an established, historic presence in Britain.

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By: Professor Douglas Crawford-Brown and Joel Faulkner Rogers

The Cambridge Retrofit Programme is  a landmark community-scale energy efficiency initiative to retrofit buildings and help make the Cambridge area the first to reach national carbon reduction targets.

The programme is being supported by YouGov to bring academic rigour to the task of understanding attitudes of stakeholders in complex debates such as retrofits. Check back periodically for the latest results on attitudes towards retrofits and related topics such as finance incentives and government policy.

Tenant Survey:

Their first major survey on behalf of Cambridge Retrofit, was completed in April 2013, focusing on the attitudes of 1543 tenants to factors involved in retrofits. Our aim was to understand what the level of demand for retrofits might be amongst tenants and the incentives that might increase demand.

Some of the more important results are summarised below:

1. Proportion of those by region of those  listing location (blue) and energy efficiency (red) as important in their choice of residence. Notice the need for significant improvements in incentives for tenants to seek higher energy efficiency.

2. Proportion of those by political affiliation who said energy efficiency was a significant factor in their choice of residence. Notice that there are marginal differences between affiliations, with Scottish and Welsh party affiliates slightly higher in their consideration of energy efficiency.

3. How much of a threat or benefit do you think rental prices, energy costs, inflation and unemployment will be to your household standard of living in the coming year? (A score of 1 means a strong benefit and a score of 10 means a strong threat). The figure below shows the average response to this question across all respondents. Notice that tenants feel energy costs are slightly more of a threat than the other three factors.

The conclusion?

Making a case through a language of reduced energy costs rather than improved energy efficiency could be a more effective way to reach tenants (even though the two are logically related).

Watch this space for a more detailed report on results from the survey of tenants in the next week…

Professor Douglas Crawford-Brown is Director of the Cambridge Centre for Climate Change Mitigation Research (4CMR)

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RUSI Analysis: The Home Affairs Select Committee has issued a highly critical first report on Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs). Its calls for stronger scrutiny and more transparency and consistency in the role should not go unheeded. Otherwise this key law and order policy of the Government could be undermined. The failings of a few need to be addressed, though this should not be allowed to overshadow the dedicated work of the majority of PCCs.

This is not a balanced  report. It concentrates not on the successes but on concerns about a small number of PCCs . It finds that 5 of the 41 PCCs in England and Wales have failed to fulfil obligations to publish financial information by the time work on the report concluded. The Committee believes greater scrutiny locally and at a national level would deter this lack of transparency.

But its biggest concern – and rightly so – is the lack of a Register of Interests – along the lines of Chief Constables, as are those  published by most others in public life. The Home Affairs Select Committee has attempted to fill the vacuum and collate such a register itself. It has not been able to get full information from every PCC although it has some on most. Its data exposes inconsistencies in for example hours worked (ranging from 35 hours to 60 plus per week). It shows that many PCCs work fulltime but at least seven still work as councillors and at least five have other part time jobs. Three PCCs are quoted as saying they see the job as a demanding, full time role. In the light of this it may well be a worthwhile exercise for the Committee or the Government to review whether part time jobs are feasible, once the new PCCs are better bedded in their jobs – perhaps after their first year in the role.

Collating this unofficial register is a worthy exercise. It is vital information. But it would be better for this to be done not by a Parliamentary Committee, but by an independent body. The report’s suggestion that this job could fall to Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary seems sensible.

Keith Vaz MP, the Chairman of the Committee believes what is needed is a register of interests to ‘guard against Maverick decision-making’.[1] The Committee cites evidence of what it appears to regard as questionable actions by PCCs. It quotes one who submitted an expenses bill of £700 for two chauffeur driven car journeys. It draws attention to what it calls the ‘fiasco’ of the teenage Youth Commissioner who had to resign over Twitter comments.

The Committee also refers to the case of the Lincolnshire PCC who suspended his Chief Constable, only to have the courts overturn the decision, with the judge noting a ‘serious error’ on his part. In the Lincolnshire case the public was not told why the Chief Constable was suspended and the local Police and Crime Panel which should have scrutinised that suspension, failed to meet for two months to evaluate the decision, asking instead for greater clarity on its position. There is little doubt this was a costly and damaging incident which highlights both the potential power of the PCC and weaknesses in the Panel system of scrutiny.

The work of the Police and Crime Panels is particularly important because it is their job to hold PCCs to account. The Panels are made up of elected local councillors and two independent members. Scrutiny beyond them rests in effect largely lies with the electorate, and the next elections are not due to be held until 2016.

Politicisation

The report also lists five PCCs who have appointed one or more political contacts onto their staff on salaries of up to £70,000. This suggests up to thirty-five other have not appointed former colleagues. Nevertheless the appointment of political allies, however small in number, could compound public fears which emerged in a RUSI/YouGov-Cambridge Poll published just before PCCs were introduced in November 2012.

The poll showed public concern that PCCs, many of whom were affiliated with political parties, could politicise policing. A key concern was the fact that scrutiny of a force would no longer be in the hands of a Police Authority made up of around seventeen local people (mainly elected) but would pass into the hands of a single person (the PCC).

There was reason behind such fears. Analysis in the Home Affairs Select Committee report shows that 51.56 per cent of the 99 candidates who stood for a PCC had been or still were elected politicians and of the 41 eventually voted in, 25 had a background in politics.

Of course it may well be that those appointed from the political world are the best people for the job – but without public scrutiny it is hard to establish this for sure.

In conclusion it seems sensible to call for a national register. This would ensure those PCCs who do not declare interests or publish budgets are exposed. It would allow the public to compare PCCs and come to an informed judgement on their performance and the appropriateness of extra jobs or income earned. And it would also show which PCCs are fulfilling their obligations to be transparent about the public money they spend and about their personal interests.

There does, too appear to be a need for stronger guidance and possibly even extra powers for Police and Crime Panels which are tasked with scrutinising and holding PCCs to account, but which in a number of cases according to the report, have not felt able or empowered to do so. They need the confidence to question decisions they or the public are not entirely happy with – such as the decision made in Lincolnshire.

This report has exposed big variations in the standard, quality and transparency of this first generation of PCCs.  And though it fails to extrapolate from the data collected the fact most PCCs are open, transparent and fulfilling their obligations – further scrutiny would not only enhance the authority of these PCCs but expose those who should be doing better.

NOTE:

The Home Affairs Committee, ‘Police and Crime Commissioners: Register of Interests’,  Thursday 23 May 2013 (First Report, Session 2013-14, HC 69).

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By: Philip Cowley

Tomorrow, we launch our annual report on the rebelliousness of MPs, packed full of data about the behaviour of MPs in the last session – who’s rebelled, how often, over what.  And whether the record-breaking behaviour seen in the first session of the Parliament continued into the second.  But how do the public react to MPs who are rebellious?

To test this, Rosie Campbell and I used a technique we’ve employed in a couple of other pieces of research (see, for example, here (£)), which is to split a polling sample, showing slightly altered information to respondents, and to see what differences this produces.  In this case, we showed all the respondents of a standard YouGov online survey two fake biographies of politicians, like this:

Politician A is 48 years old.  After university, where he studied physics, he trained as an accountant, and set up a successful company.  He is married with three children. He is an avid cricket fan, and a keen player in his youth; he is now a passionate advocate for sporting facilities for young people. He also has interests in the health service and pensions. He became an MP in 2010 and is a member of the Heath Select Committee and is known to be a hard-working constituency MP and a party loyalist.

 Politician B is 45 years old and studied business at University. Before entering politics, he was a solicitor who ran a busy local practice.  He is passionate about the environment and education. His wife is a primary school teacher and they have two children and he is a trustee of an educational charity that supports apprenticeships.  He has been an MP since 2005 and he is known for his focus on education policy, and he regularly votes against his party line.

And we then asked them which of the two they would prefer as their MP.  However, we changed the final words of profile B, to compare five different ways of presenting an MP’s voting behaviour.  One fifth of the sample (chosen randomly) saw the text as above.  The remaining respondents saw one of the following four variants:

and is one of the most rebellious MPs at Westminster

and he votes against his party in 10% of votes.

and he votes with his party in 90% of votes.

and he has voted against his party 23 times in the last year. 

These are all different ways of saying exactly the same thing.  Indeed, they are all factually true statements about the most rebellious Conservative MP in the last session of Parliament, who voted against his party line on whipped votes 23 times, some 10% of the total number of 227 votes.  One could perhaps argue about the definition of ‘regularly’ – is one rebellion in ten votes ‘regular’, or is it ‘occasional’ or maybe even ‘rare’? – but suffice to say that to the party whips, his rebellions certainly feel regular.

Shown the full text above (‘he regularly votes against his party line’), the first sub-sample answered: A: 30%, B: 48%, with 23% saying neither, a lead of B over A of 18 percentage points.  The wrong way to interpret this is to think that this proves that the public prefer a rebellious MP to a loyalist.  They may well do – and there is certainly lots of other evidence to suggest this – but there are lots of other reasons why the public might (on balance) prefer politician B to politician A (some might, for example, prefer his support for apprenticeships to A’s support for sporting facilities, others may dislike cricket or accounts or people who studied physics…).  The correct way to interpret it is merely as a base line to compare with the other ways we expressed the same level of rebellion.

These produced rather different results, down from this 18 points lead of B over A to a lead of three points for A over B, as shown in the figure below.

The most popular way to present this particular level of rebellion then is to say that one does it ‘regularly’, with the results being very similar if the actual number (23) or the percentage share of rebellion (10%) is presented.  Being labelled as ‘one of the most rebellious’ appears to be slightly less popular.  But these are all statistically insignificant differences.

But the least popular way of expressing it – and a difference that is statistically significant – is as a percentage of votes with the party.  When the public were shown a candidate who voted against their party in 10% of votes, they preferred that candidate by 15 percentage points. Yet when exactly the same information was presented as 90% loyalism, they preferred the other candidate by three points.  That is an 18 point change in the relative position of the candidates, or a hardly insubstantial 9% swing.

In part, this is just evidence of a low level innumeracy amongst much of the public, similar to that found in lots of other studies.  But it is also, we suspect, evidence of the dislike that many people have for political parties, and of their desire to see MPs behaving independently.  (It is worth remembering that these statistics were of the most rebellious Conservative MP from the last session; most other MPs were much, much more loyal).  This has implications for how we present data about parliamentary behaviour – including by organisations like the Commons themselves.  And when it comes to campaigning, incumbent MPs who have rebelled, therefore, might be wise to stress those occasions on which he or she had deviated from the party line.  But even with a very rebellious MPs, all their opponent needs to do is to stress an incumbent’s loyalty to their party.

Philip Cowley is Professor of Parliamentary Government at the University of Nottingham. 

[This post also appears on the Nottingham University blog “Ballots and Bullets” here.]

Note: we split a YouGov sample (of 1871 respondents), polled on 8-9 May 2013 into five sub-samples; findings were weighted according to YouGov’s usual weighting.

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By: the Editors

Royal Bank of Scotland (RSB) remade the headlines last week when it announced a return to profit – £826m in the first quarter of this year compared with a £1.4bn loss at the same point in 2012 – and that it could be ready to sell off part of the UK Government’s 81% stake in the bank by as early next year.

RBS Chief Executive Simon Hester said privatisation of the bank “would be a terrific thing for the country”, but according to a recent survey produced for the latest YouGov-Cambridge Conference, the British public isn’t so sure.

As part of extensive research for our April Symposium on “Public Trust in Banking”, respondents were shown several scenarios for the future of the bailed-out bank. (See results here)

A substantial 76% opposed the early move to sell the government’s stake, including:

– a 44% plurality saying “the government should hold on to its stake in RBS in the hope that shares in the bank recover and the government can sell it for a higher price later on”.

– a substantial 32% minority saying “the government should hold on to its stake in RBS for the foreseeable future and run it as a nationalised bank”.

Only 9% – less than one in ten – said “the government should sell its stake in RBS in the near future and get what money it can for it, even if it means doing so at a loss”.

Some parts of the government might be angling for a good-news story about freeing up taxpayers’ money for other needs. But as the recent YouGov report on banking helped to illustrate, some five years after the initial banking crisis, the reputation of the sector remains terrible as a whole, and public opinion still seems a long way from trusting big banks to act in the broader national interest.

73% of Britons describe the reputation of banking as bad in a list of 26 industries, giving it a joint-worst rating on the same level as betting shops, casinos and online gambling. Voters are in little doubt about its continued centrality to modern life – ranking it joint second alongside retail and after construction in a list of the most important sectors to the economy. But only 21% agree that “UK banks are now learning from their mistakes and behaviour is improving”, versus 45% who disagree. A crushing 80% majority still think banks aren’t “doing enough to get us out of this economic crisis”.

Meanwhile RBS might be recovering its balance sheet, but its overall reputation is yet to catch up.

As YouGov’s Oliver Rowe explains in the YouGov banking report: among attitudes to seven banking groups, the Co-operative Bank and Nationwide enjoy the best reputations, with 42% saying their reputations are good and around 9% saying bad (net positive for The Co-op is +34%, Nationwide +32%).

By comparison, RBS is still at the bottom of the list with 51% scoring it negatively and just 11% positive (net -40%). Barclays has a net negative of -22% while Lloyds Banking Group is net negative -20%. (See full report here)

In other words, the ways of RBS and other banks may be changing significantly, but large sections of the public are yet to notice.

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By: the Editors

The Long Slump is supposedly widening the English Channel. This is doubtless the case politically. Tough economic times have hardened British public opinion towards core elements of the European Project, from porous borders and economic interdependence to supranational policy, and in ways that are broadening the ranks of smaller parties and the schisms of big ones. In the process, Britain is heading, near inevitably it seems, towards some form of renegotiated European detachment with a slug of public support.

In other ways, however, capitalism’s latest crisis is serving to highlight a fundamental European leaning in the British mind-set, and to revise certain assumptions that emerged in the gap between Soviet and Lehman collapse about the depth of ‘Thatcherisation’ and ‘Atlanticism’ in Britain.

Lest we forget, this was a period when even left-wing gurus declared we were ‘all Thatcherites now’. And so it appeared – to an extent.

At home, the Young Turks of the New Left force-drafted a facsimile of Thatchernomics that was just about palatable to a wider Labour Party that seemed just about ready to try anything to get back into power.

Meanwhile, international financial agencies like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund sought to embed a 10-point version of the Thatcher-Reagan model for marketisation into emerging and de-Communising economies through conditional lending and structural adjustment programmes.

As Margaret Thatcher divided a nation in this period, so she polarised debate at the latest YouGov-Cambridge Conference – perhaps more noticeably as it coincided with the day of her funeral.

Held in partnership with Cambridge University and the Guardian, the programme was originally designed to look at public trust in banking five years on from the Crash, supported by a special YouGov report on the subject.

But in the week before the conference, we fast updated the programme to incorporate the renewed debate on Thatcherism and its continuing impact.

Nb: this included some exciting highlights worth a look, such as Sir Philip Hampton, Chairman of The Royal Bank of Scotland Group, challenging the popular view that British banks are maliciously withholding capital from the economy (more here); Observer Columnist Will Hutton clashing with Allister Heath, Editor of City AM, on the balance of market forces and government intervention in the causes of the crisis and strategies for recovery (more here); and Fraser Nelson, Baroness Falkner and Jonathan Freedland et al on whether the end of Thatcher’s premiership marked the start of a “post-ideological age” (more here).

The Atlantic fault-line in Western attitudes to the state

Beyond the familiar, tribal dissensus, however, both speakers and a trove of supporting conference research helped to clarify a broader, important nuance in Thatcher’s legacy, which is coming into sharper relief as the slump endures.

On one hand, the Thatcher period clearly marked a British turning point in the general acceptance of certain free market virtues.

According to research conducted in the run-up to the YouGov-Cambridge Conference, for example, Britons take a broadly Thatcherite view in their attitude towards successful and failing companies. 52% of Britons say “companies and industries that are not competitive or profitable should be allowed to close, even if this means that the people working in them lose their jobs”, versus 27% who chose the option, “Companies and industries that are not competitive or profitable should receive subsidies from the government to keep them open and protect the jobs of those working in them, even if this means higher taxes”.

Profits are usually the sign of a well-run company, according to 52% of Britons, versus 32% who say it is usually a sign that the company is exploiting workers and/or customers.

A plurality of Britons also endorse a more Thatcherite view of unions: 45% say a stronger and more influential Trade Union movement would be a bad thing for Britain, versus 34% saying the opposite.

These attitudes have stood the test of twenty years and now a severe, global crisis caused (arguably) by unrestrained capitalism.

However, if the Thatcher period hailed an enduring acceptance of certain market laws, it did less to shift deep-seated attitudes towards the scope of the government’s role in national life. As the Guardian noted in coverage of the conference and its research, Thatcher may have taught Britain to love business, but not to hate government.

Figures from the same survey show, for instance, that a strong 61% majority believe most major public utilities, such as energy and water, are best run by the public sector, as accountable to the government and Parliament, versus only 26% saying they are best run by private companies, as accountable to shareholders and regulators and competing for customers.

Long-running studies such as the British Social Attitudes Survey have suggested a longer-term hardening of attitudes in Britain towards the question of redistribution, for example with the proportion of the Britons who agree that ‘government should spend more on welfare benefits even if it leads to higher taxes’ falling from 58% in 1991 to 28% in its 2012 edition.

However, as a separate, international survey for the same YouGov-Cambridge conference also suggests, there remains an Atlantic fault-line in Western attitudes to government that leaves Britain notably closer to Europe than the United States in basic attitudes to equality, welfare, and the responsibilities of state versus individual.

Follow @YouGovCam for updates on our academic research

As a key influence in Thactherism, the Viennese intellectual Friedrich von Hayek once proposed what he called “true individualism”, which distinguished between two definitions of equalitarianism: one that tries to make people more equal through intervention, and another that seeks to ensure equal freedom to compete, which crucially denies government the right to limit what people might be fortunate to achieve.

Thatcherism canvassed tirelessly for the latter. But there’s a deep historical difference in evolution between British and American polities, which helps to account for why the harder-edged principles of Hayekian individualism are more at home in the United States than in Britain.

The American relationship of geography to individualism

From the earliest settlements, and especially from the formative era of the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth centuries, the founders of American nationhood saw themselves as exceptional not only because of their political revolution, but quite fairly on account of the very environment that became their home – a vast and rapidly discovered continent.

It was consequently a Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville, who first established the study of “American Exceptionalism” when he arrived in the United States during the 1830s hoping to understand how the American Revolution had succeeded where its French counterpart had failed. As de Tocqueville concluded, this new nation was exceptional not only in its institutions, but also – and perhaps more importantly – in its sheer abundance of space, where “God himself” had given Americans the means of remaining equal and free by placing them upon a boundless continent.

Consequently, on a crowded European landmass that has abhorred a vacuum of power and ownership since at least Charlemagne, European political philosophy has often conceived of change in the balance of wealth as requiring expropriation here and corresponding aggrandisement there.

In contrast, as colonists and migrants flooded into an allegedly open and initially expanding land of opportunity, the thrust of American political thought came to see changes in this balance as reflecting an individual’s ability to gain without necessarily taking from others.

So whereas European equalitarianism has traditionally focused on the right of people to exist on similar levels, founding American notions of equality came to focus more on people’s newfound freedom to do so on levels differentfrom others.

In this way, notions of equalitarianism evolved between the 19th and 20th Centuries with varying emphasis across the Atlantic – in America more on protecting the freedom of competition; in Europe more on aspiring to greater parity of circumstances.

This is not to fudge the particularisms of British political thought in this period – there is a very independent stream of British socialism that derives from a 19th century background of Christian as well as radical heritage.

But as the Guardian further noted in its conference coverage here and here, Britain remains broadly in line with continental Europe in accepting a basic responsibility of state to provide universal safety nets, to redistribute income and to cap the biggest pay cheques.

According to cross-country research conducted in Britain, France, Germany and the United States, 52% of Britons say the government’s job should include “redistributing from the better-off to the less well-off, right across the income range”, compared with 31% who say it should not.

Opinion-trends are similar in France and Germany: 62% of French say it should be the government’s job versus 24% saying it shouldn’t; 54% of Germans say it should versus 31% saying it shouldn’t.

Trends in the United States meanwhile are reversed: 50% say it should NOT be the government’s job versus only 32% saying it should.

In much the same fashion, 78% of Britons believe the duty of state includes making sure that rich and poor children have the same chances to get ahead, versus 14% saying it shouldn’t. The French and German publics show comparable margins: 77% and 87% respectively say it should be versus 17% and 8% saying it shouldn’t.

A majority of Americans support the proposition, but only just: 50% say it should versus 36% saying the opposite.

Similarly again, 74% of Britons and French, along with 76% of Germans believe the government should ensure every family has a decent basic minimum income, versus 16%, 18% and 16% respectively who say the opposite. The margins in America are also similar again, with 50% saying it should and 37% saying it shouldn’t.

The British and American Right compared

British and American conservatives in this context make for some notable contrasts, as Table 1 shows.

Results suggest that many British conservatives still support certain sweeping responsibilities of state where American conservatives strongly reject them.

63% of current Tory voters, for example, believe that making sure every family has a decent basic minimum income should be part of the government’s job, versus 25% who say the opposite.

Compare this with US conservatives, where only 25% say it should be the government’s job, versus 67% who say it shouldn’t.

Similarly, where 60% of current Tory voters say the government’s job should include ensuring that rich and poor children have the same chances to get ahead, only 22% of US Republicans say the same.

In a separate question we asked to what extent respondents would support an increase in the funding of government programs for helping the poor and unemployed, even if this might raise taxes. 46% of British conservatives still supported the proposition, versus 27% who opposed. Among US conservatives, only 24% chose support versus 59% who opposed. (see the full British results and full US results)

Britain is mid-Atlantic on the pay gap

The same study also tested attitudes to the pay gap between high and low salaries, and whether people at the top of the pay scale should be free to earn limitless multiples of those at the bottom.

Respondents were asked whether it was acceptable for someone in their country on a top wage, such as people running a large company or organisation, to earn 20 times more than a low-wage worker. In each country, we expressed the figures in local currencies, so people in Britain were asked if they thought it was acceptable for a high earner to earn £300,000 per year if someone on a low wage is earning £15,000 per year. In the United States the figures were $400,000/$20,000, while in France and Germany they were €400,000/€20,000.

Large majorities in continental Europe said €400,000 was unacceptable – 65% in France and 62% in Germany, versus 26% and 28% respectively saying either this was acceptable or that successful bosses should be allowed to earn still more. In contrast over the Atlantic, 53% of Americans said it was acceptable or that people ‘should be allowed to earn more’, versus 31% saying it was unacceptable. Meanwhile, the British public sits broadly divided and ‘mid-Atlantic’, with 47% saying it was unacceptable versus 42% saying acceptable.

In other words, Britain doesn’t share the same European opposition to supersized and unlimited salaries. But neither does it reflect American support for them.

More in common with the United States?

In a final question added to the British survey, we asked if people thought that Britain ultimately had more in common with the people of the United or Europe.

Interestingly, a plurality of 44% chose the United States versus a smaller 35% who chose Europe.

So it might surprise some to know that Britain still favours European equality over American individualism.

Follow @YouGovCam for updates on our on-going academic research

See the full cross-country results

See the full British results

See the full US results

See the full French results

See the full German results

See the full survey results for our final Thatcher poll

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By: the editors

The last half decade has brought new challenges for environmental activism, it seems, at a time when the combined effects of prolonged economic crisis and scientific scandal have arguably taken their toll on the movement.

According to YouGov’s annual tracker of British attitudes to renewable energy, overall public interest in the climate change debate has seen consistent decline since the onset of the banking crisis five years ago. In 2008, according to results, 72% of the British public described themselves as interested in the issue of “global warming and climate change” (n=4449). By the time YouGov fielded its latest wave of the study in 2012, this figure had fallen to 59%, while the number of those who were “not at all” or “not very” interested had risen from 26% to 39% (n=4009). The same study also shows a significant fall in the number of people attaching high urgency to the issue: 37% of respondents in 2008 described global warming and climate change as a serious and urgent problem needing immediate action. By 2012, this has fallen to 27%. (See full results here)

In each case, trend-lines see a prominent drop in concern for climate change in the period from 2009-2010, during the most intense phase of the Climategate scandal, when emails were leaked from some of the world’s leading climate scientists allegedly suggesting that standard academic practice might have been circumvented to substantiate evidence for global warming.

Between 2009 and 2010, the percentage of Britons describing themselves as interested in the issue dropped sharply by 9 percentage points from 71% to 62%, compared with smaller shifts of 1-3% among other waves. The percentage of those calling it an urgent problem requiring immediate action shows a similar pattern, dropping by 9 points from 37% to 28% between 2009 and 2010, compared with little or no fluctuation among other waves.

Despite potential effects of recession or furore, however, recent YouGov polling suggests that when it comes to telling the truth about climate change, the British public still trusts senior academics in climate science, as well as scientists in general, more than other groups or organisations. In the latest wave of an annual YouGov survey to support the Masters Degree Programme in Environmental Policy at Cambridge University, results also emphasise just how strongly the British public believe that global warming is taking place – and that human activity is either wholly or partly to blame.

Table 1 shows the British hierarchy of public trust in thirteen groups or organisations to tell the truth about climate change, according to consecutive waves of the same survey in 2012 and 2013 . The only groups that are trusted a “great deal” or “fair amount” by a majority British public in these results are “scientists in general”, “senior academics in climate science” and the BBC. (See full results for 2012 here and for 2013 here)

Ranking order remains notably consistent from first to second years of the study. Next in order are the United Nations and environmental campaigners with a more ambiguous show of confidence. Respondents are near divided in both years between those who trust the United Nations “a great deal/fair amount” or “not very much/not at all”. A small majority give environmental campaigners a negative score in 2012 (52% saying “not very much/not at all” versus 39% for “a great deal/fair amount”), which evens out to 47% versus 44% respectively in 2013.

The remaining groups or organisations on the list get a consistently poor trust score from a majority of the British public across both years: journalists on upmarket newspapers are followed by the European Union and Labour/ Liberal Democrat politicians, with Conservative politicians vying with mid-market newspapers for third and fourth place from bottom, while red-top tabloids and oil companies, perhaps predictably, get the lowest show of trust on the issue.

But although Britons lack faith in various key institutional voices on climate science, and while recent years may have seen a decline in the overall public priority afforded to environmental activism, these same results also show a stable and overwhelming consensus of people who accept – or believe depending on your view – that global warming is occurring and that human activity is mainly or partly to blame. In results for 2012, 81% of respondents overall said either the “the planet is warming and human activity is mainly responsible” (20%), or it is “warming and human activity is partly responsible together with other factors” (61%). Results for 2013 are broadly similar, with 83% overall saying the planet is warming with humans either mainly (26%) or partly (57%) responsible.

It’s too early as a time-series study to see if small changes between these waves belong to bigger trends – but watch this space for updates from the YouGov Tracker on trust in climate science.

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Doctrine and technology are like the ’chicken and egg’ of military history. It’s hard to know, for example, what came first in Washington: the decision to modify unmanned surveillance aircraft with Hellfire Missiles or a new doctrine for remote controlled killing in the military no-go atlas of the global south.

NB: this report first appeared in a Whitehall Paper on drone warfare published here and launched with a panel debate by Dr Jamie Shea, (Deputy Assistant Secretary General, NATO), Lieutenant General Sir Graeme Lamb (former Director, UK Special Forces) and others here.

Either way, an unofficial US drone programme stayed largely free from official debate for years after November 2002, when US President George W. Bush authorised the first ‘targeted killing’ with an unmanned aerial ‘drone’ in the skies over Yemen.

Until recently, that is, as leaked memos about secret US drone hubs in Saudi Arabia and White House hush-deals with the media have combined with a growing, cross-country chorus of concern towards the death toll of non-combatants, the violation of sovereignty made logistically easy, and the whole notion, accurate or otherwise, of Western political leaders with an armchair power of execution.

As public debate now catches up with a ten-year old policy, and since it was recently reported that the UK Government might be passing information to US authorities to help them carry out drone missile strikes in countries like Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, it’s fair to say that British public opinion on the subject has been variously oversimplified on a scale between nonchalantly for and hysterically against.

In support of a recent Whitehall Report on drone warfare, YouGov conducted a multi-stage study of British attitudes to the use of drones and targeted killing, including six surveys between 26 February and 8 March, 2013, with a nationally representative poll of 1,966 British adults and several survey experiments looking at different scenarios, involving at least 700 respondents in each case. (See full details of results and methodology at the bottom of this post)

According to results, the British public are broadly divided on whether the current use of drones is ultimately doing more harm or good to Western security. But there’s also a distinction between attitudes to the weapon and the way it’s used, which go beyond binary moral judgements about ‘drones-good’ or ‘drones bad’. Findings show notable public concern, for instance, towards civilian and political costs of drone warfare, and the possibility that it makes foreign intervention too easy. But a majority of respondents also support the policy, at least in principle, of targeted assassination or extrajudicial execution using drones. Many Britons perceive benefits, as well as dangers, in the precision strike capability that drones provide, such as reducing civilian casualties, and not just causing them, if counter-terrorist action or military intervention is required.

Potential Impact of Casualties on Support for Drone Strikes

For the first part of this report, YouGov conducted five experiments designed to explore how public support for government involvement in drone strikes might be affected when several independent variables are introduced, including the context of imminent threat, the targeting of UK citizens and the likelihood of varying civilian casualties.

Each survey was fielded to a different, nationally representative survey of the adult British population, including at least 1,500 respondents respectively.

In each case, respondents were first shown the following explanatory text:

 It was recently reported that the UK Government might be passing information to US authorities to help them carry out missile strikes from unmanned aircraft called ‘drones’ to kill known terrorists overseas in countries like Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.

People were then asked to what extent they would support or oppose the UK government assisting in a drone missile strike. In each case, however, we asked about a slightly different scenario, and also split the sample into two roughly equally sub-samples. In the second sub-sample, we asked yet another version of the question, this time with an added element, asking respondents to imagine the missile strike were intended to prevent an imminent threat to Britain. (Of this, more later.)

Table 1 shows the overall results from each of the first sub-samples. (See Notes on Methodology at the end of this essay for more details on Surveys 1–5)

Due to rounding, figures may not sum to 100%.

In these results, an overall majority of 55% said they support versus 23% saying they oppose in response to the basic version of the question: ‘To what extent, if at all, would you support or oppose the UK Government assisting in a drone missile strike to kill a known terrorist overseas?’

Among the camps of current voters for the three big political parties, a strong majority of Conservatives said they support (75% vs 9% oppose); as did roughly half of Labour (52% vs 29% oppose) and a smaller plurality of Lib Dems (43% vs 36% oppose).

Overall support for assisting in a missile strike increases slightly to 60% when the question includes the added detail of: ‘if the person being targeted were a UK citizen’ – potentially, we might guess, by implying a more direct threat to Britain – as does support among Conservative and Lib Dem voters. (Respectively: Cons – 79% support vs 11% oppose; Lab – 49% support vs 31% oppose; Lib Dems – 56% support vs 38% oppose.)

Perhaps predictably, support increases again to 67% overall, including majorities in each of the big parties, when the question includes: ‘if it were guaranteed that no innocent civilians would be killed by the drone strike’. (Respectively: Cons – 85% support vs 12% oppose; Lab – 61% support vs 24% oppose; Lib Dems – 59% support vs 33% oppose)

We then see that overall support for a drone strike drops substantially to 43% when the suggestion is introduced that two or three innocent civilians might be killed. The overall number of those who oppose rises to a roughly similar 41%, and the electorate becomes essentially divided.

Overall support for a drone strike drops further still to 32% when the suggestion is introduced of larger casualties, with 10–15 innocent civilians possibly killed. The overall number of those who oppose rises to a larger 46%, meaning a plurality is now against the strike.

It should be noted in these figures, however, that sensitivity to casualty rates is not uniform across the political spectrum.

When asked the question including a casualty-rate of two or three innocent civilians, Labour and Lib Dem supporters show majorities – just about – who oppose, while a substantial majority of Conservative supporters (62%) still support the missile strike. (Respectively: Cons – 62% support vs 26% oppose; Lab – 38% support vs 50% oppose; Lib Dems – 36% support vs 51% oppose.)

In response to the question including a larger casualty rate of 10–15 innocent civilians, Conservative supporters become broadly divided, while a plurality of Labour and majority of Lib Dem supporters are opposed. (Respectively: Cons – 40% support vs 45% oppose; Lab – 31% support vs 45% oppose; Lib Dems – 30% support vs 53% oppose.)

Potential Impact of an Imminent Threat on Tolerance for Casualties

In the second sub-sample of each survey, however, we also found that sensitivity to casualty rates is potentially impacted across the political spectrum by the independent variable of imminent threat.

As previously explained, in each of the five experiments, we also split the sample into two roughly equal sub-samples. In the second sub-sample, we asked a slightly re-worded version of the question in each case, but this time with an added element, asking respondents to imagine the missile strike were intended to prevent an imminent threat to Britain.

Table 2 shows the overall results from second sub-samples.

In this context, overall support remains notably less sensitive to casualty numbers. We see support for a missile strike drops from 75% to 64% among respondents overall when asked the question with a casualty rate of two or three innocent civilians instead of none, and drops further to 60% when it includes a casualty rate of 10–15 innocent civilians. But in each case, overall support retains a strong majority.

Interestingly, responses now show majority support for a missile strike among all three big political camps in both casualty scenarios.

When asked the question including a casualty-rate of two or three innocent civilians, results are respectively: Cons – 83% support vs 9% oppose; Lab – 61% support vs 24% oppose; Lib Dems – 68% support vs 22% oppose.

When asked the question including a casualty rate of 10–15 innocent civilians, results are respectively: Cons – 88% support vs 12% oppose; Lab – 58% support vs 26% oppose; Lib Dems – 53% support vs 33% oppose.

Clearly, it should be remembered that an opinion survey of attitudes to hypothetical scenarios is different from measuring public reactions to a real event. Notwithstanding, these results suggest several potential findings: first, that Conservative supporters in this study tend to show a higher tolerance to casualty rates in the name of targeting a known terrorist; second, that while sensitivity to casualties has a predictably substantial impact on support for drone missile strikes, varying majorities of respondents across the conservative/liberal spectrum also suggest they are willing to tolerate both a casualty rate of two or three innocent civilians and 10–15 civilians if they believe the action is directly linked to preventing an imminent threat to the homeland.

Attitudes to the Policy/Principle of Targeted Killing

For the second part of this study, YouGov fielded a longer, single survey to a nationally representative sample of British adults (n=1,966), looking at broader perceptions surrounding the drone debate. (See Notes on Methodology at the end of this essay for details on Survey 6.)

Before looking specifically at attitudes to drones, we tested attitudes more generally to the policy of targeted killings. As Figure 1 shows, respondents were asked to what extent they would support or oppose their government taking part or assisting in various examples of targeted killing.

Total sample = 1,966 adults. Fieldwork was conducted online between 26–27 February 2013. Figures have been weighted and are representative of all British adults aged 18 or over.

Figure 1 indicates there is little public support for actions such as assassinating Bashar al-Assad or scientists working on Iran’s nuclear programme. But a majority of the British public supports the policy, at least in principle, of assassinating known terrorists and pirates/hostage-takers.

Support is strongest in these results for the targeted killing of pirates/hostage-takers, with 57% of respondents overall saying they would support the UK government taking part or assisting in this kind of targeted killing, versus 29% saying they would oppose.

Support for assassinating known terrorists is weaker by comparison, but still constitutes an overall majority: 52% overall say they would support the UK government taking part or assisting in the assassination of terrorists in the UK, versus 34% saying they would oppose, while 54% overall say they would support similar action against known terrorists overseas, versus 31% saying oppose.

Behind national totals, Lib Dem voters stand out next to supporters of the other large parties, with less support for the policy of targeted killing against known terrorists, both in the UK and overseas. A majority of current Conservative and Labour voters said they would support the UK government taking part or assisting in the assassination of known terrorists in the UK (respectively: Cons – 63% support vs 27% oppose; Lab – 52% support vs 38% oppose), while in contrast, a 51% majority of current Lib Dem voters said they would oppose the same action, with 40% saying they would support.

Similarly, a majority of current Conservative and Labour voters said they would support the UK government taking part or assisting in the assassination of known terrorists overseas (respectively: Cons – 61% support vs 29% oppose; Lab – 55% support vs 33% oppose), while a small 53% majority of current Lib Dem voters said would oppose the same activity, with 37% saying they would support.

Attitudes to the Overall Impact of Drone Strikes on Western Security

The British public is divided, it seems, on the broad question of whether drone missile strikes in countries like Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia are ultimately helping or hindering Western security:

– 32% of all respondents say: ‘On balance, drone missile strikes have made the West more safe overall by making it easier to target known terrorists’

–31% of all respondents say: ‘On balance, drone missile strikes have made the West less safe overall by turning public opinion against us in countries where they are used’

–37% of all respondents selected ‘neither of these’/‘don’t know’.

Results further indicate a notable divide between conservative and liberal sections of the electorate.

–A plurality of Conservatives (46%) believe drone missile strikes have ultimately made the West ‘more safe’, compared with 26% saying ‘less safe’ and 27% who selected either ‘don’t’ know’ or ‘neither of these’

–By comparison, a plurality of Lib Dems (41%) say the opposite – that these strikes have ultimately made the West ‘less safe’, compared with 32% choosing ‘more safe’ and 26% who selected ‘don’t know’ or ‘neither of these’

–Attitudes among Labour supporters follow a similar direction of opinion to Lib Dems, but are more evenly spread among those who answered ‘more safe’ (29%), less safe (36%) and either ‘don’t know’ or ‘neither of these’ (34%).

Attitudes to Pro/Con Arguments about Drones

This is not to suggest there is no consensus in British attitudes to drones. People were also asked to what extent they agree or disagree with three pro-drone arguments and three con-drone arguments that have helped to characterise recent public debate on the subject.

These arguments included:

–‘Drones help to reduce casualties by removing the need to send in people on the ground’

–‘Drones help to reduce casualties because of their accuracy compared with other weapons used over long distances’

–‘Drones are a useful tool for gathering intelligence’

–‘Drones give Western politicians too much personal power to pick and choose who is killed’

–‘Drones make it too easy for Western governments to conduct military strikes in foreign countries’

–‘Drones are more likely to cause civilian casualties than other weapons used over long distances’.

Figure 2: ‘Thinking about drone missile strikes, to what extent, if at all, do you agree or disagree with the following statements?’

Total sample = 1,966 adults. Fieldwork was conducted online between 26–27 February 2013. Figures have been weighted and are representative of all British adults aged 18 or over.

Responses to ‘Pro-Drone’ Arguments

A 57% majority agreed overall that drones help to reduce casualties ‘by removing the need to send in people on the ground’. This included majorities among supporters of all three major parties. (Respectively: Cons – 68% agree vs 8% disagree; Lab – 57% agree vs 14% disagree; Lib Dems – 60% agree vs 15% disagree.)

A significant plurality (47%) also agreed that drones help to reduce casualties ‘because of their accuracy compared with other weapons’. This included a majority of current Conservative voters and a plurality of current Labour voters, while a plurality of Lib Dems disagreed. (Respectively: Cons – 57% agree vs 8% disagree; Lab – 49% agree vs 16% disagree; Lib Dems – 36% agree vs 18% disagree.)

A clear majority further agreed that drones are useful for intelligence, including similar majorities among supporters of the major parties. (Respectively: Cons – 70% agree versus 5% disagree; Lab – 62% agree versus 6% disagree; Lib Dems – 65% agree versus 9% disagree)

Responses to ‘Contra-Drone’ Arguments

In the same results, however, a significant plurality agreed that ‘drones make it too easy for Western governments to conduct military strikes in foreign countries’, with 47% of respondents overall saying they agreed. This included majorities or pluralities of Conservative, Labour and Lib Dem supporters saying the same. (Respectively: Cons – 46% agree vs 20% disagree; Lab – 51% agree vs 12% disagree; Lib Dems – 58% agree vs 12% disagree)

The electorate is more politically divided on the question of individual accountability among policy-makers. Just 39% of respondents overall agreed with the statement ‘drones give Western politicians too much personal power to pick and choose who is killed’, while 15% disagreed, 28% said ‘neither agree nor disagree’ and 18% selected ‘don’t know’. A majority of Lib Dems agreed, along with a smaller plurality of current Labour voters, while Conservative responses essentially mirrored the national totals. (Respectively: Cons – 37% agree vs 23% disagree; Lab – 43% agree vs 14% disagree; Lib Dems – 52% agree vs 12% disagree)

Finally, a wide spread of answers was produced with no strong trend in responses to the statement: ‘Drones are more likely to cause civilian casualties than other weapons used over long distances’. 24% of respondents overall agreed, alongside 26% who chose ‘neither agree nor disagree’, 25% who said ‘disagree’ and 24% who selected ‘don’t know’. Responses among party camps showed a similar divergent spread of percentages.

Greater Public Concern towards the Current Policies of Drone Warfare than its Fundamentals

In summary, these figures suggest an important fault-line in public opinion towards drones. The British public may be divided overall on whether current drone deployments are doing more harm than good to Western security. But there is also a distinction between attitudes to the effect of drone policy and belief in the potential merits of drones themselves.

Among the first category of attitudes, a third of Britons believe the current use of drones is undermining Western security by turning public opinion against those associated with the strikes, while substantial pluralities among more liberal voters believe it gives politicians too much power to ‘pick and kill’. Nearly half of the electorate also say drones are making it too easy for Western governments to take military action on foreign soil.

But in the second category, a cross-party majority agree that drones help to reduce casualties by removing the need for boots on the ground, and a plurality including nearly 60% of Conservatives and almost half of Labour supporters agree they help to reduce casualties through their comparative accuracy. A majority also support the policy in principle of targeting killings against known terrorists, albeit with a small majority of opposition from Lib Dems.

In other words, public concern and uncertainly is more focused towards the terms and conditions of current drone policy, rather than the fundamental principle of targeted killing with drones.

Responses further indicate some characteristic political fault-lines, with current Conservative voters more supportive of both done strikes and British assistance in their deployment than either Labour or Liberal Democrat (Lib Dem) supporters. Conservatives in this study also tended to show a higher tolerance to casualty rates in the name of targeting known terrorists.

Results in the experimental section further show that sensitivity to casualties has a predictably substantial impact on support for drone strikes. However, varying majorities of respondents across the political spectrum also suggest they would be willing to tolerate a certain level of casualties if the action were directly linked to preventing an imminent threat to the homeland.

Notes on Methodology

Survey 1 was undertaken between 27–28 February 2013. Total sample size was 1,761 British adults. The survey was carried out online. The overall sample was split into two sub-samples of n=883 and n=878. Full results can be found here.

Survey 2 was undertaken between 3–4 March 2013. Total sample size was 1,727 British adults. The survey was carried out online. The overall sample was split into two sub-samples of n=871 and n=856. Full results can be found here.

Survey 3 was undertaken between 4–5 March 2013. Total sample size was 1,906 British adults. The survey was carried out online. The overall sample was split into two sub-samples of n=933 and n=973. Full results can be found here.

Survey 4 was undertaken between 6–7 March 2013. Total sample size was 1,865 British adults. The survey was carried out online. The overall sample was split into two sub-samples of n=953 and n=912. Full results can be found here.

Survey 5 was undertaken between 7–8 March 2013. Total sample size was 1,525 British adults. The survey was carried out online. The overall sample was split into two sub-samples of n=802 and n=723. Full results can be found here.

Survey 6 was undertaken between 26–27 February 2013. Total sample size was 1,966 British adults. The survey was carried out online. Figures have been weighted and are representative of all British adults aged 18 or over. Full results can be found here.

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[Originally reported here / see full results here] Americans and Britons are deeply sceptical about the idea of arming Syria’s rebels and the possibility of sending western troops into the country, according to a bilateral poll.

Despite the escalating civil war, growing casualty figures and a rising tide of refugees flooding out of Syria, there is little appetite for more robust action than the current approach of providing “non-lethal support” to the rebels, the YouGov poll found.

There have been increasing demands on Capitol Hill to arm the opponents of the Assad regime or intervene more directly, and this week Barack Obama toughened his own rhetoric amid contested claims about Damascus using chemical weapons. But the new binational survey – produced for YouGov-Cambridge, the polling company’s academic thinktank – finds US voters opposed to the idea of supplying munitions by a 29-point margin: 45% against to 16% in favour.

Identical questions were posed in Britain, where David Cameron has, with the French president, François Hollande, recently tried and failed to persuade the EU to lift its arms embargo. But the British public emerges as even more strongly against: 57% oppose arming the rebels and 16% are in favour.

In both the UK and the US, opposition to arming the rebels is marked on the right as well as the left of the political spectrum: 52% of American Republicans and 63% of British Conservatives are against supplying arms.

Any thought of sending western troops into Syria would also be badly received – especially in the UK. By a 32-point margin (55%-23%) Britons reject the idea of sending in UK and allied troops to protect civilians. The anti-intervention lead rises to 59 points (68%-9%) if the aim were “overthrowing President Bashar al-Assad”.

In the US too, proposals to put boots on the ground would run up against public opinion. Americans lean 33%-27% against sending in troops “to protect civilians”, and are more decisively against directly enforcing regime change, splitting 42%-16% against. Although more Republicans (22%) than Democrats (14%) would be prepared to support the latter, the partisan difference are not as great might have expected given the continuing divisions over the war to topple Saddam Hussein.

A decade on from the invasion of 2003, YouGov reaffirms the verdict of other pollsters and finds a rough two-to-one (53%-27%) balance of Britons saying that the war launched by George Bush and Tony Blair was wrong rather than right.

US opinion is more evenly divided, with those who believe the war was right holding a slim 41%-38% edge. And whereas in Britain, opposition is consistent across supporters of different parties, in the US the political divide is stark. Democrats judge the war a mistake by a 53%-23% margin, but Republicans remain even more convinced that it was right, splitting 72% to 12% in favour.

While no political faction in either Britain or the US is comparably belligerent in connection with Syria, the mood is not isolationist either. There are strong majorities in favour of the official policy on both sides of the Atlantic, of providing the rebels with “non-lethal support”.

In the US the Obama administration has concentrated on softer support, such as food and medical supplies, but the question’s wording also referred to “armoured vehicles and body armour”, the sort of harder-edged interpretation of “non-lethal” supplies being emphasised by London.

Even with the proposition put in these terms, Americans split 45%-24% in favour of providing the supplies, a 21-point margin. In Britain, the 57%-22% pro-intervention majority on this count is even more emphatic, at 35 points.

For pro-intervention hawks, such as Senator John McCain in the US and increasingly Cameron himself in Britain, there is another encouraging finding. Respondents on both sides of the Atlantic are in favour of “enforcing a no-fly zone over Syria so the Syrian air force cannot attack rebels or civilians”. In the UK that proposition wins public support by a 43-point margin, with 61% in favour and 18% against. In the US there is a 50% to 18% majority behind the same proposition.

If these results point to mixed public attitudes to Syria, YouGov-Cambridge’s detailed analysis on the legacy of Iraq also defies easy characterisation.

Britons are disinclined to believe the conflict made the world a safer place – only 14% say so, as against 38% who judge it has made the world more dangerous and 40% who say it made little difference. They are likewise disinclined to believe the invasion made the lives of ordinary Iraqis better (only 24% think so), and by 71% to 12% they also believe Iraq will remain “permanently unstable” as opposed to becoming a “peaceful democracy”. Americans are somewhat more sanguine on all these counts, in line with their less hostile overall verdict on the war, but in the United States, too, a clear majority of 56% believes Iraq is set for permanent instability.

When memories of Saddam Hussein are invoked, however, the picture changes: by 41% to 21% Britons judge that despite the suffering of war Iraqis would have been even worse off under the rule of Saddam, and in the US opinion leans the same way, by 46% to 17%. These final results seem out of kilter with the UK’s anti-war sentiment in particular. It could be that some respondents are reasoning that while Iraqi life would have been worse under Saddam he might by now have been brought down by other means – or it could be that people give different answers to similar questions phrased in different ways.

YouGov-Cambridge surveyed 1,684 British adults online on 10 and 11 March and a further 1,962 on 13 and 14 March, and 1,022 American adults online from 12 to 14 March. The figures have been weighted and are representative of British and American adults aged 18 or over.

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